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ABSTR ACT: A concept of positive strategic shock would benef it the
US Department of Defense’s planning processes. Some US doctrine
demonstrates awareness of the need to plan for negative strategic
shocks but lacks consideration of positive strategic shock—any shock
with a non-zero-sum outcome—which could create a situation where
the Department of Defense misses opportunities. This article clarif ies
the term positive strategic shock, provides a brief review of where and
how planning for any sort of strategic shock currently occurs, and
makes recommendations based on three methods for think ing about
strategic shock.
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lthough US doctrine demonstrates awareness of the need
to plan for negative strategic shocks, the lack of consideration
of disruptive effects caused by positive strategic shocks could
leave the Department of Defense (DoD) in a position where it misses the
benefits of such shocks.1 Advocacy for incorporating positive strategic
shock in DoD planning processes first requires clarification of the term.
Negative strategic shock refers to the deleterious facet of “unknown unknowns”
and more practical “known unknowns” mentioned by the then Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and later analyzed by Nathan Freier and
others, but positive strategic shock must be more ambiguously defined.
After establishing a working definition of negative and positive strategic
shock, the article explores existing processes for responding to strategic shock.
Finally, three methods for thinking about strategic shock in planning—
those of reframing, horizon scanning, and the “barbell” approach—
form a basis for recommendations on how to consider incorporating a concept
of positive strategic shock in DoD planning processes.
1. Paul Austin Murphy, “Rumsfeld’s Logic of Known Knowns, Known Unknowns and Unknown
Unknowns,” A Philosopher’s Stone (blog), December 12, 2020, https://medium.com/the-philosophers-stone
/rumsfelds-logic-of-known-knowns-known-unknowns-and-unknown-unknowns-f506db31ac74; Nathan Freier,
Known Unknowns: Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in Defense Strategy Development (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2008), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a489100.pdf; and Nathan Freier, Robert Hume,
and John Schaus, “Special Commentary: Memorandum for SECDEF: Restore ‘Shock’ in Strategic Planning,”
May 5, 2020, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/COVID-19-Shocks_Freier_Hume
_Schaus_v1.3_post.pdf.
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Coming to Terms with Strategic Shock
Positive strategic shock, and strategic shock more generally, require
clarification before proceeding. First, it is important to note that a parallel
exists between defense-related strategic shock and the concept of disruption
in business models. Former Harvard Business School professor Clark Gilbert
observes that, like strategic shock, the concept of disruption “has usually
been considered by established businesses as an attack that must be met
through defensive measures.” Gilbert also points out, however, that “the
real story behind disruptive innovation is not one of destruction, but of its
opposite: In every industry changed by disruption, the net effect has been
total market growth.”2 This initial tendency within established businesses
to frame disruption negatively provides a starting point for a critique of
defense-related strategic shock. Is only the negative aspect considered? If so,
is it because only negative strategic shocks exist or because threat perceptions
within the Department of Defense choose to focus on the negative?
Before focusing specifically on positive strategic shock, strategic shock
should be understood more generally. Freier links “defense-relevant” strategic
shock to the same forces operating in business when he characterizes strategic
shocks as “disruptive, transformational events for DOD [Department
of Defense].”3 Freier explains that, despite some degree of uncertainty
in origin and exact nature, his work considers only shocks that display clear,
promulgating trends. This means the shock experienced could have been
recognized and accounted for in advance if not for the decisions to ignore
certain data and analysis.4 Rumsfeld advocated a more complete framework for
shock, events deriving from both unknown unknowns and known unknowns.5
Freier considers only the known unknowns while relegating the unknown
unknowns to a domain too speculative to bear consideration in DoD resource
allocation or planning.6 This dismissal of the unknown unknown is precipitous,
however, as possibilities exist for the Department of Defense to posture itself
vis-à-vis unknown unknowns without overcommitting resources.
Although Rumsfeld’s quote popularized these terms, had been in
use in strategic planning and project management since the late 1990s.7
A known unknown is an anticipated gap, which, according to Rumsfeld,
2. Clark Gilbert, “The Disruption Opportunity,” MIT Sloan Management Review, July 15, 2003,
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-disruption-opportunity/.
3. Freier, Hume, and Schaus, “Restore ‘Shock’ in Strategic Planning,” 1.
4. Freier, Hume, and Schaus, “Restore ‘Shock’ in Strategic Planning,” 1.
5. Donald H. Rumsfeld and Richard B. Myers, “DoD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen.
Myers,” (briefing, US Department of Defense, Washington, DC: February 12, 2022), https://archive.today
/20180320091111/http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636.
6. Freier, Known Unknowns, 11.
7. Murphy, “Rumsfeld’s Logic.”
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can eventually be made a “known known” through “[asking] the right questions.”8
Therefore, known unknowns do not necessarily portend strategic shock,
except in instances when an organization fails to ask the right questions.
Conversely, unknown unknowns, unanticipated gaps in knowledge,
are what Nassim Nicholas Taleb calls “Black Swans” in his metaphor
for events characterized by “rarity, extreme impact, and retrospective
(though not prospective) predictability.”9 Unlike Taleb, Freier does not address
the potential for such unpredictable events to exhibit positive potentiality,
but he does capture the importance of examining a gap in defense strategy
that does not address the known unknown as “unconventional ground
where irregular, catastrophic, and hybrid ‘threats of purpose’ and ‘threats of
context’ rise and mix in complex combinations to challenge core interests.”10
Freier provides a model for thinking about shock in DoD planning, but
his model is limited to the known unknown and negative strategic shock.
Expanding Freier’s thinking to consider the Black Swan and the
known unknown as they relate to planning in the Department of Defense
and to incorporate the possibility of positive strategic shock provides
a more complete framework. Whether in utter surprise at a Black Swan
or in a situation where blindness compounds the effect of a known
unknown, shock will disrupt the Department of Defense if the institution
has not developed a process allowing it to anticipate and implement policy
before experiencing shock.11 Again, that shock could be negative or positive,
and the ways an organization thinks about and responds will—or at least
should—differ on a case-by-case basis. This is why an expansion of Freier’s
thinking, and the work to define that expansion, is important.
The term positive strategic shock has already been used in strategic
planning literature, albeit with a meaning slightly divergent from the
beneficial Black Swan or known unknown. Colin S. Gray has extrapolated
a positive outcome can be obtained when negative shocks force an enterprise
to recognize a deficiency and play catch-up. Gray writes, “Considered
positively, national security challenges may well lend themselves persuasively
to identification of opportunities.”12 Like Freier’s phrasing, Gray’s phrasing
precludes a positive event. Instead, Gray focuses on the idea that even
negative shocks have the potential for positive benefits. By Gray’s definition,
8. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), xiv.
9. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House,
2007), xviii.
10. Freier, Known Unknowns, 13.
11. Freier, Known Unknowns, 7.
12. Colin S. Gray, Categorical Confusion? The Strategic Implications of Recognizing Challenges Either
as Irregular or Traditional (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2012), 20, https://ssi.armywarcollege
.edu/2012/pubs/categorical-confusion-the-strategic-implications-of-recognizing-challenges-either-as-irregularor-traditional/.
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positive strategic shock is merely dependent on negative strategic shock and
not considered an independent occurrence.
Adding additional confusion, Peter Schwartz, in Inevitable Surprises
(Gotham Books, 2003), takes a more nuanced approach to describing the
same process of achieving positive results from a negative shock. He reframes
the perspective taken on a negative strategic shock, such as that of mass
immigration to Europe, as a positive shock, or positive when viewed
from a different perspective.13 This case would require Europe to reframe its
stance on immigration with a more inclusive and therefore entrepreneurial
spirit along the lines of what Schwartz asserts has been a historical strength
for America.14 This process of reframing bears further consideration
as a recommendation for how the Department of Defense might better plan
for strategic shock. Differentiating and recognizing the past usage by Gray and
Schwartz of the term positive strategic shock helps frame a more complete set
of recommendations.
Finally, for clarity, a few additional terms require further discussion.
First, the gravity of labeling a shock as strategic should not be ignored, nor
should the occasional overuse of the term strategy dilute its connotations.
According to Freier, shocks of this magnitude “jolt convention to such an
extent that they force sudden, unanticipated change in the Department
of Defense’s (DoD) perceptions about threat, vulnerability, and strategic
response. Their unanticipated onset forces the entire defense enterprise
to reorient and restructure institutions, employ capabilities in unexpected
ways, and confront challenges that are fundamentally different than those
routinely considered in defense calculations.”15
Working from this definition, many historical examples of shock appear
insufficiently disruptive, and many scanning processes for shock are ineffective.
Whether an event is truly strategic in nature matters because issues below the
strategic level tend not to disrupt the Department of Defense as an institution
and pose less of an existential threat. For example, while the advent
of hypersonic missiles is sometimes labeled a strategic issue, it has not created

13. Peter Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises: Thinking ahead in a Time of Turbulence (New York: Gotham Books, 2003),
49, 67–69. See also p. 12 for similar reframing of IBM’s transition from mainframe to services business model.
14. Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises, 49, 67–69.
15. Freier, Known Unknowns, vii.
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a need for restructuring institutions, only additional research and perhaps
some technological one-upmanship at the operational level.16
Due to its highly subjective nature, “positive” also risks being misused
in discussions of strategic shock. One way to overcome that subjectivity
is to equate positivity with the concept of a non-zero-sum game.
Unlike most sports where one competitor loses as a condition of the other
winning, in a non-zero-sum (also win-win) scenario both parties win because
the activity creates aggregate growth.17 They often avoid direct confrontation
in favor of approaches and actions that at least fractionally align and thus
mutually reinforce one another.18 The definition of positive strategic shock
used here, therefore, does not equate to positive gain contingent on negative
shock, nor does it involve reframing a negative event as a positive one.
The definition avoids a consideration of shock that occurs at a lower
(perhaps operational or tactical) level. Instead, positive strategic shock
represents a non-zero-sum occurrence requiring significant institutional
reorientation. It falls within either the category of unknown unknowns or the
known unknowns for which the Department of Defense has not adequately
planned. The defining characteristic of positivity becomes its non-zerosum orientation. Based on this definition, shocks that are positive for the
United States but negative for its competitors or partners are still considered
negative strategic shocks.
Here, a few concrete examples will help ground the discussion and clarify
how certain past shocks were both strategic and non-zero-sum. Although
not exhaustive, these examples display varying degrees of import to the
military industrial capability of the Department of Defense. They include the
discovery and proliferation of vaccines, the widespread ability to refrigerate
food, and the development of the Internet. These are non-zero-sum because
they benefit most, if not everyone, and operate at the strategic level rather
than the operational or tactical levels. Looking to the future, the Department
of Defense should anticipate the possibilities of cold fusion and asteroid
mining as potentially non-zero-sum and strategically significant.
Unknown unknowns, however, are by definition unpredictable. The
very act of attempting to predict a Black Swan goes against Taleb’s model,
which he calls the “ ‘barbell’ strategy,” for how best to prepare.19 Discussion
16. David Axe, “Wrong: Why Hypersonic Weapons Aren’t Even Really a Real Weapon (Yet),” Buzz (blog),
March 18, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/wrong-why-hypersonic-missiles-arent-even-really-real
-weapon-yet-134322.
17. Business Terms Editors, “Non-Zero Sum Game,” Business Terms (website), n.d., accessed January 16, 2022,
https://businessterms.org/non-zero-sum-game/.
18. Business Terms Editors, “Non-Zero Sum Game.”
19. Taleb, Black Swan, 205, 207.
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of concrete unknown unknown examples becomes counterproductive,
though recommendations for how to prepare still contain valuable insights
for the Department of Defense and will be covered later in this article.

Processing Strategic Shock
One significant obstacle in responding to positive strategic shock is the
near absence of a planning methodology around shock of any sort. A review
of US military doctrinal guidance yields no mention of positive strategic shock
and little on strategic shock of any sort.20 The Joint Operating Environment
2035 (JOE 2035) contains only five references to shock, four that are not
germane to a discussion of positive strategic shock and one that recognizes
overemphasis of traditional planning as a negative but depreciates shock
as “low-end.”21 JOE 2035’s one nod to shock states, “Placing too much
emphasis on contested norms—particularly those high-tech and expensive
capabilities geared to contain or disrupt an expansionist state power—
may discount potentially disruptive low-end threats, which have demonstrated
a troubling tendency to fester and emerge as surprise or strategic shock
for the United States.”22
This statement is neither prescriptive nor comprehensive with respect
to shock. Unlike Taleb’s or Freier’s works, JOE 2035 does not approach shock
for what it is: a force of uncertainty with which senior DoD leaders should
most closely contend, and the mechanism that accounts for most growth and
change in the world.23 Even more troubling, many erstwhile strategic think
pieces in the defense space do not consider shock at all; instead they only
speculate on relatively noncontroversial and predictable known unknowns.

20. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America: December 2017 (Washington, DC:
White House, 2017), 14, http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/2017.pdf; and US Army Training
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare,
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2019), 18, https://adminpubs.tradoc.army.mil
/pamphlets/TP525-92.pdf.
21. Joint Chiefs of Staff, (JCS), Joint Operating Environment, JOE 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested
and Disordered World (Washington, DC: JCS, 2016), iii, 55, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents
/Doctrine/concepts/joe_2035_july16.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162059-917.
22. JCS, JOE 2035, 51.
23. Freier, Known Unknowns, 3; and Taleb, Black Swan, 134.
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These pieces include efforts by large organizations, like the RAND
Corporation’s predictive work, and publications by independent analysts.24
The lack of consideration for strategic shock in strategic thinking
and DoD planning processes leaves the Department of Defense open
to criticism that it is reactive, lacking in imagination, and vulnerable
to surprise.25 Freier explains that “[s]hocks . . . undermine prevailing
strategy and planning assumptions.” Shocks also often lie outside what
Sam J. Tangredi refers to as “traditional or permitted” areas of defense
inquiry.26 Freier also cites two positive developments in incorporating
strategic shock into planning processes. The first is the “Strategic Trends
and Shocks” project that began in 2008 in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense as a response to a lack of warning around the insurrection after
Operation Iraqi Freedom.27 The second is the awareness of shock’s absence
in planning processes demonstrated in the National Defense Strategy:
“The Department should also develop the military capability and capacity
to hedge against uncertainty, and the institutional agility and flexibility
to plan early and respond effectively alongside interdepartmental,
non-governmental and international partners.”28 This statement does not
mention shock specifically, but it can be read as an acknowledgment of, and
a directive to employ agility and flexibility to, the great uncertainty of shock.
One additional attempt at institutionalizing planning for strategic shock
is the State Department’s “Project Horizon.” This project demonstrates how
the issue of shock, as mentioned in the National Defense Strategy, affects
national strategy across interdepartmental lines.29
That the Department of Defense has not formalized a planning process
even for the negative aspect of known unknown strategic shock likely
stems from a conservative mindset.30 Conservatism of this sort leaves the
24. Raphael S. Cohen et al., Peering into the Crystal Ball: Holistically Assessing the Future of Warfare
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10073.
html; Raphael S. Cohen et al., The Future of Warfare in 2030: Project Overview and Conclusions (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2849z1.html;
James M. Dubik, “No Guarantees When It Comes to War,” Association of the United States Army (website),
August 22, 2018, https://www.ausa.org/articles/no-guarantees-when-it-comes-war; Kimberly Amerson
and Spencer B. Meredith III, “The Future Operating Environment 2050: Chaos, Complexity and Competition,”
Small Wars Journal (website), July 31, 2016, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-future-operating-environment
-2050-chaos-complexity-and-competition; and Anja Kaspersen, Espen Barth Eide, and Philip Shelter-Jones,
“10 Trends for the Future of Warfare,” World Economic Forum (website), November 3, 2016, https://www
.weforum.org/agenda/2016/11/the-4th-industrial-revolution-and-international-security/.
25. Freier, Known Unknowns, 1.
26. Freier, Known Unknowns, 4; Sam J. Tangredi, All Possible Wars? Toward a Consensus View
of the Future Security Environment, 2001-2025, McNair Paper 63 (Washington, DC: National Defense
University, 2000), 119.
27. Freier, Known Unknowns, 38, 10n.
28. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
June 2008), 5, https://nssarchive.us/national-defense-strategy/national-defense-strategy-2008/.
29. Freier, Known Unknowns, 25.
30. Freier, Known Unknowns, 13, 20, 27.
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organization and the nation open to strategic surprise.31 Furthermore, the
presence of this conservative mindset demonstrates that the consideration
of unknown unknowns and positive strategic shock must first overcome
the Department of Defense’s more basic resistance to planning for shock.
This conservatism and institutional inertia may be factors leading the
Department to keep to the status quo—a good thing in the case of a negative
strategic shock, but potentially not when confronted with non-zero-sum
sea change.32

Methods to Prepare for Shock
While organizations struggle to anticipate and plan for the risks
or rewards of shock, three methodologies suggest ways the Department
of Defense should prepare and position itself to adapt and respond to positive
shock. These methodologies are the process of horizon scanning as advocated
by Freier, the reframing technique demonstrated by Schwartz, and Taleb’s
barbell approach. While only Taleb specifically considers and proposes
techniques anticipating positive strategic shock, all three methodologies offer
insights and ideas useful for DoD planners to consider.
Freier’s horizon-scanning technique responds to the DoD’s perceived
hesitancy to engage in speculation and commit resources based on such
speculation.33 This horizon-scanning technique bridges the gap between
the areas of “prudent hedging,” analogous to the known unknown, and
highly speculative, extreme scenarios that could prove disruptive but cannot
be accommodated in planning activities because the almost unlimited range
of futuristic, low-probability challenges does not warrant the expenditure
of resources or brainpower.34 While this is a step in the right direction,
Freier’s application of the technique still considers only the negative aspect
of shock, where other nations or forces gain an advantage that requires the
United States to catch up.
In another work on the subject of shock, Freier encourages a process
of horizon scanning as a low-cost solution to address this planning gap.35
He proposes the Department of Defense and its components engage outside
entities to identify disruptive shocks in a way that focuses on the competitive
domains unique to each component.36 Strategic planning processes
31. Freier, Known Unknowns, 1, 14, 20.
32. M. Chris Mason, “Strategic Insights: Better Late than Never,” Strategic Studies Institute (website),
October 23, 2018, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/articles/articles-2018/better-late-than-never/.
33. Freier, Known Unknowns, 20.
34. Freier, Known Unknowns, 11.
35. Freier et al., “Restore ‘Shock’ in Strategic Planning,” 2.
36. Freier et al., “Restore ‘Shock’ in Strategic Planning,” 6.
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incorporating such horizon scanning can at least make the known unknown
foreseeable with enough detail that planners and leaders can justify devoting
resources to the consideration of branches and sequels to the main plan.37
Beyond the fiscal hesitancy surrounding attempts to put planning
rigor around speculation, Freier asserts “curiosity about and investigation
into the unconventional and the unknown” are somewhat countercultural
for the Department of Defense.38 Advocacy for consideration of positive
strategic shock in DoD planning represents a more speculative and less
obviously urgent need than anticipating an adversary’s shocking, zero-sum
technological advances. As such, and as with any idea that requires fiscal
input and a change of thinking, the consideration of positive strategic shock
will meet with more resistance from the Department of Defense, even though
it does form a logical extension of Freier’s proposition.
Two points from Schwartz’s Inevitable Surprises add rigor and criteria
for positivity to this approach to framing a process for thinking
about positive strategic shock. First, Schwartz identifies four conditions
stemming from science and technology that contribute to strategic change.
If applied to the third-party competitive analysis recommended by Freier,
a process watching for the convergence of these conditions could help the
Department of Defense identify at an early stage potential domains
within which to expect positive strategic shock. Passive scanning of this
sort would also prevent early and speculative commitment of resources.
The conditions Schwartz identifies are: the emergence of scientific
anomalies, the development of new instruments that detect phenomena never
before observed, comparatively rapid and effective communication
among scientists, and a culture that values and rewards scientific and
technological research.39
Oddly enough, earlier in Inevitable Surprises, Schwartz points out a fifth
condition (omitted from his later list) that is an even better indicator of
a non-zero-sum or positive situation—the presence of trust. It should
therefore represent a way to distinguish positive shock from a negative one
early in the horizon-scanning process. Schwartz mentions trust in the context
of globalization, venturing the quantity of technological advancement and
the quality of it depends on trust and mistrust at several levels: between
businesses, at the level of individual investors and financial institutions,
at the consumer level, and between governments. Trust creates the
possibility of greater connectivity that supports at least two of the bullets
37. Freier, Hume, and Schaus, “Restore ‘Shock’ in Strategic Planning,” 5.
38. Freier, Known Unknowns, 27.
39. Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises, 162–65.
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in Schwartz’s four-point science and technology scanning criteria: rapid and
effective communication and the presence of a culture that values science
and technology.40
A competitive and cooperative horizon-scanning analysis using all
five of these conditions can identify hotspots for positive strategic shock.
It should watch for scientific anomalies, new instruments for phenomena
detection, rapid and effective communication, the presence of a political
and economic culture rewarding science and research, and a high degree
of trust among organizations and individuals. Whether a shock is an unknown
unknown or can be extrapolated based on emerging trend lines making
it a known unknown matters less than embracing a process that watches for
these developments.
The DoD operational-design methodology is the obvious candidate
for incorporating Freier’s horizon scanning and Schwartz’s conditions.
Operational design already involves reviewing and reframing based
on evolving conditions, though it neither excludes nor requires consideration
of strategic shock.41 The addition of a step in which planners scan the
operational environment for potential strategic shock using Schwartz’s criteria
could become a simple and cost-effective way to formalize consideration
of strategic shock in the DoD’s current processes.
In addition to contributing this useful set of conditions to the horizonscanning methodology, Schwartz proposes the previously discussed
methodology of reframing a problem set to account for shock. He explains
reframing through the examples of immigration in Europe and IBM’s
reorientation away from selling mainframe systems to providing consultative
services.42 Although this technique does not assist planning efforts in
the same way as horizon scanning or the barbell method, DoD strategists
should consider reframing as a useful way to recover from strategic shock.
More specifically, reframing brings non-zero-sum thinking into play
by looking for ways to create a win-win situation from a shock. What
Schwartz extrapolates from both the immigration scenario and the IBM
business model is the tendency to return to the status quo and the flexibility
and adaptability within an organization to take a shock, view it in retrospect,
and find and maximize the non-zero-sum potential of the new paradigm.
In the immigration scenario, Schwartz articulates the zero-sum and
non-zero-sum perspectives by juxtaposing and correlating the consequences
40. Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises, 83.
41. JCS, Joint Planning, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2020), iv, 5, https://www.jcs.mil/
Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0.pdf.
42. Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises, 12, 49, 67–69.
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of one’s beliefs about immigration with one’s beliefs in the limits, or lack
thereof, of societal wealth.43
Rather than forcing itself back to status quo, Schwartz advocates for
Europe to adopt the second non-zero-sum perspective, which he models
on the then US policy. He thereafter uses the United States’ edge in creativity
and entrepreneurship as proof that such reorientation would “solve” the
strategic shock of the European immigration issue.44 This reorientation
turns negative shock into positive shock and provides a model DoD strategic
planners could use, rather than attempting to anticipate shock, to build
positive shock-aware branches and sequels.
Earlier, several examples of positive strategic shock (vaccines, the Internet,
and refrigeration) were mentioned to ground the discussion and show how
shocks can be strategic and non-zero-sum. The fact that vaccines, the Internet,
and refrigeration became positive is clear in hindsight but may not have been
clear at the moment of their invention. These innovations may not have been
adopted and their impact may not have been so significant and strategic
without some of Schwartz’s conditions for adaptation being operative,
especially the conditions of trust, rapid communication, and a culture that
rewards scientific and technological achievement. Uneven implementation
rates and the impact of these examples and other such positive strategic
shocks across cultures and communities support this supposition.
Similarly, IBM was able to use a shift to non-zero-sum thinking to solve
the problems it faced at the advent of the personal-computing revolution.
The inherently positive shock of powerful home- and desktop-computing
options changed the nature of work. Rather than trying to force those consumers
into a model that had worked previously for IBM, the company survived as
a business because it recognized the non-zero-sum nature of the change.
It understood it might lose market share overall, but the aggregate size
of the computing industry would grow to such a degree that its profits
could increase even with a more modest and specific slice of the market.45
The same dynamic is operative for the Department of Defense, but it is not
a one-to-one comparison. The dynamic manifests differently because
the connection between the Department of Defense’s constituency and

43. Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises, 49.
44. Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises, 49.
45. Schwartz, Inevitable Surprises, 12.
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its problem set is less immediate than the one between a business and
its customers.
In business, clearly understanding the customer is a critical component
of success, extending deeply into any successful company’s processes and
products, since customers can rapidly vote (so to speak) on such processes and
products with their purchasing power.46 While the Department of Defense
clearly knows its customers, the business model by which those customers
dictate their interests is not as straightforward as an exchange of capital.
The DoD’s process involves translating guidance and strategic direction
through the slow filter of representative democracy where outcomes can
become muddied as they compete with values, debates, and forces other
than voters’ direct input.47 Additionally, the Department of Defense does
not enjoy the luxury of new customers in the same way a business might,
were it to innovate. Instead, the Department of Defense has the same
customers who engage in an ongoing reassessment of their values.
Reframing, for the Department of Defense, becomes a unidirectional
endeavor because it lacks the feedback loop of customers voting with their
purchasing power. It is reactive to national-level strategic guidance and,
thereafter, communicates its direction and actions to its customers when
those customers cannot use their purchasing power in as unambiguous a way
as they would in a business matter.
One speculative scenario for the Department of Defense that could
benefit from a similar reframing approach might be movement into what
some economists call a “post-scarcity economy,” one where advances in
critical economic drivers, such as energy and food production, make possible
a non-zero-sum economic system.48 In this situation, one indicator
of aggression might be the incitement to a false sense of scarcity.
While economic or production measures could deflate such a false
proposition in a whole-of-government approach, security structures like
the Department of Defense could also prepare branches and sequels with
flexibility and adaptability that recognize the positive, non-zero-sum nature
of such a development and actively oppose the aggression of false incitement.
This example of anticipating and reframing a potential shock could help the
Department of Defense tailor its reactions in a way that supports the emerging
shock and contributes to the non-zero-sum phenomena. Yet, to do so,
46. Gilbert, “Disruption Opportunity.”
47. Erik Olin Wright, How to Be an Anticapitalist in the Twenty-First Century (London: Verso, 2019), 8.
48. Philip Sadler, Sustainable Growth in a Post-Scarcity World: Consumption, Demand, and the Poverty
Penalty (Surrey, UK: Gower Publishing, 2010), 7.
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the Department of Defense would first need to be aware of the shock,
recognize it as potentially or likely positive, and then act accordingly.
The third methodology, the barbell in Taleb’s The Black Swan, accounts
for the negative and positive ends of the spectrum. In its simplest format,
Taleb frames the barbell approach as the need to be “robust to negative
Black Swans and exposed to positive ones.”49 Robustness combats negative
strategic shock by building redundancy and survivability for systems
in an organization, so when a negative shock occurs, those systems survive
and help the organization recover toward the status quo. On the other end
of the spectrum, Taleb recommends organizations maximize and optimize
exposure to positive strategic shock, given the unpredictable and temporal
nature of Black Swans.50 This call to create a diversity of opportunity on the
positive end of the spectrum dovetails well with Freier’s advocacy for horizon
scanning but goes beyond it in its encouragement of bottom-up awareness
mechanisms. In fact, horizon scanning and the barbell method complement
one another; horizon scanning works for the known unknown because
it begins with identification of a trend line, and the barbell method applies to
the unknown unknown where trend lines remain speculative.
An example of a process already employed within the Department
of Defense involving scanning and exposure at the operational level fitting
within Taleb’s barbell approach is the effort of the Center for Army Lessons
Learned (CALL). The center provides a bottom-up funnel for ideas at
the tactical and operational levels.51 Taleb’s concept of exposure is closer
to what the Center for Army Lessons Learned does than Freier’s chartered
third-party competitive analysis, though the two models likely would support
each other in practice.
Pushing the identification of new, potentially shocking technological and
organizational solutions down to the user level allows the process to iterate
more quickly, reducing costs and risks and facilitating a propagation of the
best ideas without committing institutional weight. Rather than looking
at technology as determinant, which would be easier from a predictive
standpoint, the Department of Defense should recognize that most
organizations are unsure of what to do with a particular piece of technology
until it undergoes a period of experimentation and adaptation by end users.52
49. Taleb, Black Swan, 48.
50. Taleb, Black Swan, 337.
51. Michael Benvenuto, “Why the Center for Army Lessons Learned Is More Relevant than Ever
(and How NCOs Can Harness This Resource),” NCO Journal (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press,
September 2018), 1–3, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/nco-journal/docs/CALL.pdf.
52. Greg Satell, “4 Innovation Lessons from the History of Warfare,” Forbes (website),
March
14,
2015,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2015/03/14/4-innovation-lessons-from-the
-history-of-warfare/?sh=2987828573f3.
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Maximum exposure of end users to new technology allows them to determine
its best value, which lies at the heart of Taleb’s barbell approach. This approach
is more cost-effective than speculative top-level DoD endeavors to anticipate
technological and organizational shock.
The third portion of Taleb’s barbell model applies to the middle area,
the handle of the barbell figure. He radically de-emphasizes the so-called
safe middle ground, which he asserts is rife with prediction errors.53 Since
more conservative investors or organizations feel safest with risk measures
developed within—and therefore only applicable to—this middle ground,
they leave themselves exposed to extreme fluctuations of risk on either end
of the barbell—negative and positive shocks.54 Taleb further asserts that almost
all change and growth occur due to shocks on either end of this spectrum, not
just known unknowns but the truly unanticipated Black Swans.55 If, as Freier
says, the Department of Defense operates almost exclusively within the safe
middle area, then it misses both areas of learning.56 The DoD’s robustness—
that is, its redundancy and survivability—is a product of an environment
of ongoing reactivity to negative strategic shock. While that robustness
is good, it misses the other end of the learning spectrum by overlooking the
possibility of intentional orientation toward positive strategic shock.
Taleb puts an exclamation point on this theory when he discusses the
strategy he employs for investment. This strategy involves taking risks
when he anticipates exposure to positive Black Swans, being conservative
around negative Black Swans, and ignoring the flawed middle. It seems
simple enough, yet he demonstrates that it is the exact opposite of what
other investors do. They use “flimsy theories to manage their risks and
put wild ideas under ‘rational’ scrutiny.”57 Whether this method extends
to decision making in the Department of Defense would form a good subject
for follow-on analysis. Based on Freier’s assessment of the DoD’s lack
of incorporation of strategic shock in planning, it seems the
Department of Defense follows a logic similarly biased toward known risks
extrapolated from models of linear rather than shock-based learning.
Antulio J. Echevarria II and Huba Wass de Czege advocate for the
Department of Defense to orient itself toward positive ends while recognizing
the pursuit of positive opportunities will require more short-term costs

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Taleb, Black Swan, 333–34.
Taleb, Black Swan, 333.
Taleb, Black Swan, 451.
Freier, Known Unknowns, 13.
Taleb, Black Swan, 451.
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in terms of resources and planning.58 Their advocacy complements Freier’s
case for considering shock more fully, though Freier does not specify the
need to account for shock’s positive aspect. Combining these positions,
the need for relatively low-cost planning methodologies that allow the
Department of Defense to posture for strategic shock and prepare for both its
positive and negative aspects becomes apparent. Horizon scanning, reframing,
and the dual ends of the barbell of exposure and robustness are all low-cost
methods to incorporate positive strategic shock into DoD planning processes.
The Department of Defense can quickly and efficiently adopt these
processes by taking the following steps. First, it should incorporate a few key
indicators of potential shock (such as certain convergences of scientific and
technological indicators) in chartered third-party competitive analyses and
operational design. Second, it should actively plan branches and sequels that
give leaders time and space to reframe shocks in a non-zero-sum manner.
Third, the Department of Defense should leverage and create capabilities
similar to CALL to reward the “up-funneling” of strategically shocking
innovation for quick and wide adoption in an iterative, entrepreneurial
manner. These measures should be taken while continuing to build robust
systems through traditional means to prepare for the negative aspects
of shock. Finally, incorporating scanning, framing, and methods for exposure
to positive strategic shock would form useful additions to existing educational
programs at the strategic level (such as Joint Professional Military Education
Phases I and II) and within lower levels of military education where
frontline leaders should be exposed to indicators of emerging strategic shock.
These recommendations will encourage leaders and planners to embrace
the idea that the unknown and its environment of negative and positive

58. Antulio J. Echevarria II and Huba Wass de Czege, Toward a Strategy of Positive Ends (Carlisle, PA:
US Army War College Press, 2001), ix, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/105.
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uncertainty are the world’s, and hence the Department of Defense’s,
predominant vehicle of change.

Conclusion
Challenges that the Department of Defense would face when implementing
some or all of these recommendations could include the following.

•

First, a small budgetary and administrative burden would accrue
in order to create CALL-like capabilities or programs to sense
and reward the “up-funneling” of innovation.

•

Second, educational programs have finite bandwidth and
many competing priorities for the attention and instruction
of students, fitting in blocks of theory around shock in all its
forms should not be problematic except insofar as it would
require reprioritization of other material.

•

The third, and easiest, would be to include a requirement
in future horizon-scanning third-party analyses and in the
operational-design process for a consideration of the elements
that could indicate upcoming disruption—trust within
scientific communities, the emergence of scientific anomalies,
the development of new instrumentation, increases in effective
communication, and the presence of political and economic
culture valuing science and research.

These recommendations offer a range of approaches that avoid futile efforts
to predict the unknown unknown while posturing the Department of Defense
to take advantage of the positive and negative aspects of shock.
The implication of not adopting a mindset oriented to shock, of which
positive strategic shock is an overlooked subset, is that decisions will derive
from safe and predictable, but incorrect prognoses based on trend lines and
other flawed statistical approaches. Shock on both ends of the spectrum,
negative and positive, creates the greatest opportunities for growth and
success. Embracing methods to deal with shock (such as the barbell approach,
the horizon-scanning methodology, and educational improvements to teach
shock in existing curricula) will be healthy for the Department of Defense’s
planning processes and provide a competitive advantage over enemies who
think more linearly in a less revolutionary manner.
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